šŸ“‘ The Case Against Google

Bookmarked The Case Against Google by Charles Duhigg (nytimes.com)

Antitrust has never been just about costs and benefits or fairness. Itā€™s never been about whether we love the monopolist. People loved Standard Oil a century ago, and Microsoft in the 1990s, just as they love Google today.

Rather, antitrust has always been about progress. Antitrust prosecutions are part of how technology grows. Antitrust laws ultimately arenā€™t about justice, as if success were something to be condemned; instead, they are a tool that society uses to help start-ups build on a monopolistā€™s breakthroughs without, in the process, being crushed by the monopolist. And then, if those start-ups prosper and make discoveries of their own, they eventually become monopolies themselves, and the cycle starts anew. If Microsoft had crushed Google two decades ago, no one would have noticed. Today we would happily be using Bing, unaware that a better alternative once existed. Instead, weā€™re lucky a quixotic antitrust lawsuit helped to stop that from happening. Weā€™re lucky that antitrust lawyers unintentionally guaranteed that Google would thrive.

Charles Duhigg takes a look at the history of Anti-Trust laws and the breaking up of monopolies. From oil to IBM, he explains why it is important for this large companies to be broken up. Not because of the consumer, but rather for the sack of developnent and innovation.

He uses the case of the vertical search site, Foundem.com, to demonstrate the way in which Google kills competition by removing them from searches.

In 2006, Google instituted a shift in its search algorithm, known as the Big Daddy update, which penalized websites with large numbers of subpages but few inbound links. A few years later, another shift, known as Panda, penalized sites that copied text from other websites. When adjustments like these occurred, Google explained to users, they were aimed at combating ā€œindividuals or systems seeking to ā€˜gameā€™ our systems in order to appear higher in search results ā€” using low-quality ā€˜content farms,ā€™ hidden text and other deceptive practices.ā€

Left unsaid was that Google itself generates millions of new subpages without inbound links each day, a fresh page each time someone performs a search. And each of those subpages is filled with text copied from other sites. By programming its search engine to ignore other sites doing the same thing that Google was doing, critics say, the company had made it nearly impossible for competing vertical-search engines, like Foundem, to show up high in Googleā€™s results.

Rather than living off their innovation, Adam and Shivaun Raff have spent the last twelve years campaigning against Google. Supported by Gary Reback, they took their case to European Commission in Brussels.

Reback had told Adam and Shivaun that it was important for them to keep up their fight, no matter the setbacks, and as evidence he pointed to the Microsoft trial. Anyone who said that the 1990s prosecution of Microsoft didnā€™t accomplish anything ā€” that it was companies like Google, rather than government lawyers, that humbled Microsoft ā€” didnā€™t know what they were talking about, Reback said. In fact, he argued, the opposite was true: The antitrust attacks on Microsoft made all the difference. Condemning Microsoft as a monopoly is why Google exists today, he said.

If such changes and challenges is dependent on individuals such as the Raffā€™s standing up, it makes you wondering how many just throw it all in. Cory Doctorow captures this scenario in his novel, The Makers.

5 responses on ā€œšŸ“‘ The Case Against Googleā€

  1. K. Sabeel Rahman takes a look at changes in construct of power. He unpacks the way in platform capitalism has come to control many elements of society. These changes can be organised into three categories:

    Transmission power: The ability of a firm to control the flow of data or goods (Amazon)
    Gatekeeping power: Control of the gateway to an otherwise decentralized and diffuse landscape (Google Search)
    Scoring power: ratings systems, indices, and ranking databases

    Rahman provides a number of suggestions for how we can respond to this situation:

    Public options
    Structural restraints on data and power
    Big data tax
    Anti-trust movements

    He gives the example of the New Deal and the way it broke up the oil monopolies. Another example is the response to Microsoft at the end of the 90ā€™s. Whatever the solution(s), it will involve rethinking the way we see technology. Something that the Luddbrarian discusses in regards to Facebook.
    via Ian Oā€™Byrne

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  2. Zeynep Tufekci captures some of the complexities associated with fixing up big tech. A few things that stand out is that the answer is not splitting up big tech or simply respond to the threat of Russia. As she explains:

    Russia did not instigate the moves that have reduced Americansā€™ trust in health authorities, environmental agencies, and other regulators. Russia did not create the revolving door between Congress and the lobbying firms that employ ex-politicians at handsome salaries. Russia did not defund higher education in the United States. Russia did not create the global network of tax havens in which big corporations and the rich can pile up enormous wealth while basic government services get cut.

    Instead we need to:

    Figure out how our institutions, our checks and balances, and our societal safeguards should function in the 21st century.

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  3. Nilay Patel explores the idea of reimagining anti-trust laws. At the moment there is too much grey for lawyers to argue about in regards to changes in price. Tim Wu and Hal Singer suggest that we need to think of anti-trust from the perspective of competition, not just cost. This is something that has been said about Google as much as Facebook. Cory Doctorow has also written about the problems big tech.

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  4. Cory Doctorow discusses Dina Srinivasanā€™s new paper The Antitrust Case Against Facebook published in the Berkeley Business Law Journal. Srinivasan documents the rise of the platform and how it would not have been possible in a pre-Reagan era. The association between monopoly and surveillance is also explored:

    Srinivasanā€™s history of Facebookā€™s surveillance rollout makes link between monopoly and surveillance clear. For its first ten years, Facebook sold itself as the pro-privacy alternative to systems like Myspace, Orkut, and other competitors, repeatedly promising that it wouldnā€™t track or analyze its users activity. As each of Facebookā€™s competitors disappeared, Facebook advanced its surveillance technology, often running up against user resistance. But as the number Facebook alternatives could go declined ā€” because Facebook crushed them or bought them ā€” Facebookā€™s surveillance became more aggressive. Today, with Facebook as the sole dominant social network, people who leave Facebook end up joining Instagram, a Facebook subsidiary.

    This is a topic Tim Wu, Charles Duhigg and Lina Khan have discussed. A summary of the paper was also published by the Institute for New Economic Thinking.

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